Articles

2021

“Doubts, Philosophy, and Therapy”
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45, pp. 1–23

“Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on common sense and metaphysical analysis”
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29, pp. 914–934

“Disagreement unhinged constitutivism-style” (with M. Palmira)
Metaphilosophy 52, pp. 402–415

“Strange bedfellows. On Pritchard’s disjunctivist hinge epistemology”
Synthese 198, pp. 3521–3532

2020

“Are there mathematical hinges?”
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10, pp. 346–366

2019

“Skepticism unhinged”
Belgrade Journal of Philosophy 32, pp. 7–23

“Testimonial hinges”
Philosophical Issues 29, pp. 53–68

“Disagreeing with myself: Doxastic commitments, Moore’s paradox and belief revision”
American Philosophical Quarterly 56/1, 15–28

“Replies to commentators”
Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 47, pp. 343–352

2018

“Precis of The Varieties of Self-Knowledge”
Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 47, pp. 281–291

“What do philosophers do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein”
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8/3, pp. 198–207

2017

“Précis of Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology”
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7/4, pp. 217–234

“Replies to commentators”
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7/4, pp. 281–295

“Stopping points: I, immunity and the real guarantee”
Inquiry 60/3, pp. 233–252

2016

“Which hinge epistemology?”
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6, pp. 79–96

“Io: un indicale essenziales?”
Iride, pp. 341–346

“How to perceive reasons”
Episteme 13/1, pp. 77–88

2015

“How to commit Moore’s paradox”
The Journal of Philosophy CXII/4, pp. 169–192

2014

“Basic Disagreement, Basic Contextualism and Basic Relativism” (with S. Moruzzi)
Iride XXVI/73, pp. 537–554

“Crispin Wright” (with A. Sereni)
Aphex, Portale italiano di filosofia analitica

2013

“Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense”
Philosophia: The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 41, pp. 1–12

“Replies”
Philosophia: The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 41, pp. 81–96

“Some observations on François Recanati’s Mental Files” (with D. Belleri)
Disputatio 5/36, pp. 1–11

“Sulle origini dell’oggettività”
Iride 68, pp. 183–189

“Dal senso ai sensi… e ritorno”
E/C VII/17, pp. 63–67

2012

“Truth-relativists can’t trump moral progress” (with S. Moruzzi)
Analytic Philosophy 53/1, pp. 47–56

“Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission–what else?!)”
Synthese 189/2, pp. 235–254

“Percepire le ragioni?”
Iride 65, pp. 119–132

“Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing as”
Synthese 186/1, pp. 121–148

“Critical notice of Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity”
Disputatio 4/33, pp. 515–530

2010

“Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?”
Philosophical Investigations 33/1, pp. 1–23

“Moore’s Proof and Martin Davies’ epistemic projects”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88/1, pp. 101–116

“Notes on Italian philosophy, peer-reviews and ‘la corruttela’””
Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 38/1, pp. 29–39

2009

“Self-knowledge and commitments”
Synthese 171/3, pp. 365–375

“Tu chiamale se vuoi ‘emozioni’”
In F. Cimatti (a cura di), Linguaggio ed emozioni, Bollettino Filosofico del Dipartimento di Filosofia dell’Università della Calabria, 24, pp. 71–85

2008

“The paradox of Moore’s Proof of an external world”
The Philosophical Quarterly 58, pp. 234–243

“Peacocke’s self-knowledge”
Ratio XXI/1, pp. 13–27

“Alcune osservazioni su verità, relativismo, filosofia e dibattito pubblico”
Jura Gentium IV

2007

“Il puzzle della Prova del mondo esterno di Moore”
Epistemologia 29/1, pp. 61–78

“Error through misidentification: some varieties”
The Journal of Philosophy CIII/8, pp. 403–425

“Self-Knowledge. One More Constitutive View”
Preprints Dipartimento di Filosofia 28, pp. 101–121

2003

“Error through misidentification, the split between semantic and speaker’s reference and the real guarantee”
The Journal of Philosophy C/8, pp. 416–431

“The Problem of the Finer-Grained Content of Experience: A Redefinition of its Role within the Debate between McDowell and Non-Conceptual Theorists”
Dialectica 57/1, pp. 57–70

2002

“Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error through Misidentification”
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9/1, pp. 27–34

“On What There Really is to Our Notion of the Ownership of a Thought: A Reply to John Campbell”
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9/1, pp. 41–46

2001

“Wright and McDowell on the Content of Perception and the Justification of Empirical Beliefs”
Lingua e Stile 36/1, pp. 3–23

1997

“Moore: scetticismo e senso comune”
Lingua e Stile 32/2, pp. 167–188