In epistemology, I have developed a constitutivist form of “hinge epistemology”—a term that I coined for a new trend in epistemology inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty. I have explored its bearing on the structure of justification, skepticism, relativism, testimony, disagreement, and knowledge of basic logical laws and other basic principles of human inquiry.
In philosophy of mind, I have worked on indexicals, particularly ‘I’, and demonstratives, on the nature of perceptual content, and on the nature of concepts and of intententional mental states.
At the interface between epistemology and the philosophy of mind, I have developed a pluralistic account of self-knowledge and have explored its bearing on the issue of self-deception, Moore’s paradox, belief revision, and the possibility of intrapersonal disagreement.
In the history of analytic philosophy my work concerns mostly G. E. Moore and L. Wittgenstein with special reference to their contributions to epistemology. More recently, I have developed an interest in the work of Susan Stebbing (a philosopher of common sense and the first woman philosophy professor in the UK), as well as in Wittgenstein’s morphological method and Goethe’s influence on him and other members of the Vienna Circle, such as Friedrich Waismann.
Lately, I have developed an interest in various topics in social epistemology (testimony, disagreement, trust, epistemic injustice and authority) and in their applications in the medical context and to the dissemination of knowledge in the digital era.