Book Chapters


“‘So one cannot say “There are objects” as one says “There are books”’: From Tractatus 4.1272 to Carnap, via On Certainty 35–37”
In A. Pichler et al. (eds.) 100 Years of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus — 70 Years after Wittgenstein’s Death: A Critical Assessment, Berlin, De Gruyter, forthcoming.

“On the Hypothetical Given: Experiences, Views, and Proofs”
In M. Vuletić and O. Beck (eds.) Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience, Dordrecht, Springer, forthcoming

“A Debate on Skepticism and Perceptual Belief” (with A. Gupta and C. Wright)
In M. Vuletić and O. Beck (eds.) Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience, Dordrecht, Springer, forthcoming


“Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and Disagreement” (with L. Doulas)
In J.A. Carter, M. Baghramian, and R. Rowland (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, London, Routledge.

“Propositional and Doxastic Hinge Assumptions”
In P. Silva and L. Oliveira (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justifications: New Essays on their Nature and Significance, London/New York, Routledge, pp. 162–180.


“Hinges, radical skepticism, relativism and alethic pluralism”
In N. Pedersen and L. Moretti (eds.) Non-evidentialist Epistemology, Brill, pp. 97–117

“I know, I know, I know. Hinge Epistemology, invariantism and skepticism”
In C. Kyriachou and J. Wallbridge (eds.) Invariantism and skepticism, London, Routledge, pp. 213–234

“Which hinge epistemology between animal, bioscopic and constitutivist?”
In D. Moyal-Sharrock and C. Sandis (eds.) Hinge Epistemology, London, Anthem


“Against Wittgensteinian entitlements”
In N. Jang Lee Ling Pedersen and P. Graham (eds.) Epistemic Entitlement, Oxford University Press, pp. 327–343

“Wittgenstein’s critique of logical atomism in the Philosophical Investigations”
In U. Zilioli (ed.) Atomism in Philosophy. A History from Antiquity to Present, Bloomsbury, pp. 301–311

“What do philosophers do? Maddy, Moore (and Wittgenstein) II”
In J. Kennedy and S. Arbeiter (eds.) The Philosophy of Penelope Maddy, Springer

“In quest of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology”
In N. Da Costa and S. Wuppuluri (eds.) Looking at Things From the Point of View of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, Springer, pp. 107–121

“Hinge disagreement” (with M. Palmira)
In Kusch, M. (ed.) Social Epistemology and Epistemic Relativism, Routledge, pp. 11–29


“Waismann on belief and knowledge”
In S. Shapiro and D. Makovec (eds.) Friedrich Waismann. The Open Testure of Analytic Philosophy, London, Palgrave, 89–106

“Hinge epistemology and relativism”
In M. Kusch (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Routledge, pp. 320–328

“Dialetheism in action: a new strategy for solving the equal validity paradox” (with S. Moruzzi)
In A. Rieger and G. Young (eds.) Dialetheism and Its Applications, Springer, pp. 57–80


“What anti-realism about hinges could possibly be”
In Epistemic Realism and Anti-Realism: Approaches to Metaepistemology. Edited by R. McKenna and C. Kyriacou, London, Palgrave: 267–288

“Practical knowledge and linguistic competence”
In A. Coliva. S. Moruzzi and P. Leonardi (eds.) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, London, Palgrave, pp. 337–356

“Moore and Mooreanism”
In B. Reed and D. Machuca (eds.), Scepticism. From Antiquity to Present, Bloomsbury, pp. 467–480

“Wittgenstein, self-knowledge and nature”
In T. Raleigh and K. Cahill (eds.) Wittgenstein and Naturalism, Oxford-New York, Routledge, pp. 96–118

“Gettier and context” (with D. Belleri)
In S. Hetherington (ed.) Gettier and Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 78–95

“Self-knowing interpreters”
In J. Kirsch and P. Pedrini (eds.) Third Person Self-Knowledge, Interpretation and Narrative, Springer, pp. 13–29


“Rituals, Philosophy, Science, and Progress: Wittgenstein on Frazer”
In Beale J., Kidd I.J. (eds.), Wittgenstein and Scientism, Oxford-New York: Routledge, p. 39–58

“How to be a pluralist about self-knowledge”
In A. Coliva and N. Pedersen (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism, London, Palgrave, pp. 253–284


“Relativismo e differenza chez Wittgenstein”
In A. Contini, E. Moietta, A. Ramploud (eds.) Metamorfosi delle differenze, Roma, Aracne, pp. 119–147

“Wittgenstein. Quattro temi dalle Note sul Ramo d’oro di Frazer”
In D. Generali (ed.) Le radici della razionalità critica: saperi, pratiche, teleologie. Saggi in onore di Fabio Minazzi, Udine, Mimesis, pp. 86–105


“Moderatism, transmission failures, closure and Humean skepticism”
In D. Dodd and E. Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 248–272

“Faultless disagreement and the equal validity paradox” (with S. Moruzzi)
In F. Bacchini, S. Caputo, M. Dell´Utri (eds.) New Frontiers in Truth, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Cambridge, pp. 38–62

“Epistemology” (with M. C. Amoretti)
In T. Andina (ed.) Bridging the Analytic Continental Divide. A Companion to Contemporary Western Philosophy, Brill Leiden-Boston, pp. 38–64


“Scepticism and knowledge”
In M. Beaney (ed.) Oxford Handbook for the History of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 975–1002


“Relativismo e multiculturalismo” (with M. Palmira)
In C. Baraldi (ed.) Gli invisibili. La condizione degli immigrati nella società, Bonanno, Roma, pp. 19–39

“Epistemologia (o della conoscenza)” (with C. Amoretti)
In T. Andina (ed.) Filosofia contemporanea. Uno sguardo globale, Roma, Carocci, pp. 59–91

“Moore’s Proof, liberals and conservatives—is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?”
In A. Coliva (ed.) Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford, OUP, pp. 323–351

“One variety of self-knowledge: constitutivism as constructivism”
In A. Coliva (ed.) The Self and Self-Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 212–242

“Which key to all mythologies about the self?”
In F. Recanati and S. Prosser (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. New Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 22–45


“Intuizioni comode: Sosa tra Moore e Wittgenstein” (with M. Palmira)
In R. Davies (ed.) Analisi, Milano, Mimesis, pp. 291–304

“Wittgenstein out of context”
In C. Jaeger, W. Loeffler (eds.) Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg 7-13 Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 50–51


“Sull’idea stessa di relativismo”
In V. Villa (ed.) Relativismo: temi e prospettive, Roma, Aracne, pp. 155–175

“La verità di Rorty, tra Vattimo e Marconi”
In M. Carrara e V. Morato (eds.) Verità, Udine-Milano, Mimesis, pp. 261–270


“Cartesio: costitutivismo senza introspezionismo?”
in Dellantonio, S., Pastore, L. (eds.) Rappresentazione, percezione e coscienza, ETS, Pisa, pp. 95–113

“What kind of entities are concepts?”
In D. Gambarara, A. Givigliano (eds.) Origine e sviluppo del linguaggio, fra teoria e storia. Atti del XV Convegno della Società di filosofia del linguaggio, Aracne editrice, Roma, pp. 211–219


“Il relativismo si dice in molti modi. O forse in nessuno?”
In F. Giuliani e M. Barni (eds.) Il logos nella polis. La diversità delle lingue e delle culture, le nostre identità. Atti del XIV Convegno della Società di Filosofia del linguaggio, Roma, Aracne, pp. 439–452


“Lo scetticismo sull’esistenza del mondo esterno”
In A. Coliva (ed.) Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, Carocci, Roma, pp. 255–280

“Lo scetticismo sull’esistenza del mondo esterno”
In M. De Caro, E. Spinelli (eds.) Lo scetticismo antico e contemporaneo, Carocci, Roma, pp. 186–210. (Abridged version of 35)


“Moore’s paradox and commitments. On this very complicated concept of belief”
In P. Leonardi (ed.) Facets of concepts, Il Poligrafo, Padova, pp. 233–252


“Proof of an external world: transmission-failure, begging the question or dialectical ineffectiveness? Moore, Wright and Pryor”
In A. Coliva and E. Picardi (eds.), Wittgenstein Today. Il Poligrafo, Padova, pp. 411–429


“Moore’s Proof of an external world. Just begging the question”
In W. Loeffler and P. Weingartner (eds.) Proceedings Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg XI, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 91–96

“Io pensieri e metafisica dell’io: ovvero dell’anti-cartesianesimo nella filosofia antica, medievale e analitica”
In M. Carrara, G. De Anna, S. Magrin (eds.) Saggi di filosofia del linguaggio, filosofia della mente e metafisica, Il Poligrafo, Padova, pp. 193–213


“In difesa del contenuto non-concettuale della percezione”
In P. Parrini (a cura di) Conoscenza e cognizione, Guerini, Milano, pp. 147–161


“Wittgenstein’s Distinction between Uses of ‘I’ as Subject and as Object at the Origin of the No-Subject View about the Self and its Solution”
In Berit Brogaard (ed.) Rationality and Irrationality Pre-proceedings of the 24th Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, pp. 117–122


“Wittgenstein: certezza versus scetticismo e naturalismo”
In D. Marconi (ed.) Naturalismo e naturalizzazione, Mercurio edizioni, Vercelli, pp. 169–187