In Progress

“What Philosophical Disagreement and Philosophical Skepticism Hinge on” (with L. Doulas)


“Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on common sense and metaphysical analysis”
British Journal for the History of Philosophy

“Disagreement unhinged constitutivism-style” (with M. Palmira)

“Are there mathematical hinges?”
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism


“Skepticism unhinged”
Belgrade Journal of Philosophy 32, pp. 7–23

“Testimonial hinges”
Philosophical Issues 29, pp. 53–68

“Disagreeing with myself: Doxastic commitments, Moore’s paradox and belief revision”
American Philosophical Quarterly 56/1, 15–28

“Replies to commentators”
Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 47, pp. 343–352


“Strange bedfellows. On Pritchard’s disjunctivist hinge epistemology”
Synthese, pp. 1-12

“Precis of The Varieties of Self-Knowledge”
Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 47, pp. 281-291

“What do philosophers do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein”
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8/3, pp. 198–207


“Précis of Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology”
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7/4, pp. 217–234

“Replies to commentators”
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7/4, pp. 281–295

“Stopping points: I, immunity and the real guarantee”
Inquiry 60/3, pp. 233–252


“Which hinge epistemology?”
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6, pp. 79–96

“Io: un indicale essenziales?”
Iride, pp. 341–346

“How to perceive reasons”
Episteme 13/1, pp. 77–88


“How to commit Moore’s paradox”
The Journal of Philosophy CXII/4, pp. 169–192


“Basic Disagreement, Basic Contextualism and Basic Relativism” (with S. Moruzzi)
Iride XXVI/73, pp. 537–554

“Crispin Wright” (with A. Sereni)
Aphex, Portale italiano di filosofia analitica


“Hinges and Certainty. A Précis of Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense”
Philosophia: The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 41, pp. 1–12

Philosophia: The Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 41, pp. 81–96

“Some observations on François Recanati’s Mental Files”(with D. Belleri)
Disputatio 5/36, pp. 1–11

“Sulle origini dell’oggettività”
Iride 68, pp. 183–189

“Dal senso ai sensi… e ritorno”
E/C VII/17, pp. 63–67


“Truth-relativists can’t trump moral progress” (with S. Moruzzi)
Analytic Philosophy 53/1, pp. 47–56

“Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission–what else?!)”
Synthese 189/2, pp. 235–254

“Percepire le ragioni?”
Iride 65, pp. 119–132

“Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing as”
Synthese 186/1, pp. 121–148

“Critical notice of Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity”
Disputatio 4/33, pp. 515–530


“Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?”
Philosophical Investigations 33/1, pp. 1–23

“Moore’s Proof and Martin Davies’ epistemic projects”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88/1, pp. 101–116

“Notes on Italian philosophy, peer-reviews and ‘la corruttela’””
Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 38/1, pp. 29–39


“Self-knowledge and commitments”
Synthese 171/3, pp. 365–375

“Tu chiamale se vuoi ‘emozioni’”
In F. Cimatti (a cura di), Linguaggio ed emozioni, Bollettino Filosofico del Dipartimento di Filosofia dell’Università della Calabria, 24, pp. 71–85


“The paradox of Moore’s Proof of an external world”
The Philosophical Quarterly 58, pp. 234–243

“Peacocke’s self-knowledge”
Ratio XXI/1, pp. 13–27

“Alcune osservazioni su verità, relativismo, filosofia e dibattito pubblico”
Jura Gentium IV


“Il puzzle della Prova del mondo esterno di Moore”
Epistemologia 29/1, pp. 61–78

“Error through misidentification: some varieties”
The Journal of Philosophy CIII/8, pp. 403–425

“Self-Knowledge. One More Constitutive View”
Preprints Dipartimento di Filosofia 28, pp. 101–121


“Error through misidentification, the split between semantic and speaker’s reference and the real guarantee”
The Journal of Philosophy C/8, pp. 416–431

“The Problem of the Finer-Grained Content of Experience: A Redefinition of its Role within the Debate between McDowell and Non-Conceptual Theorists”
Dialectica 57/1, pp. 57–70


“Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error through Misidentification”
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9/1, pp. 27–34

“On What There Really is to Our Notion of the Ownership of a Thought: A Reply to John Campbell”
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 9/1, pp. 41–46


“Wright and McDowell on the Content of Perception and the Justification of Empirical Beliefs”
Lingua e Stile 36/1, pp. 3–23


“Moore: scetticismo e senso comune”
Lingua e Stile 32/2, pp. 167–188


“A. Byrne Transparency and Self-Knowledge” (with E. Mark)
Mind, forthcoming

“S. Goldberg Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism: New Essays”
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, on-line first, 2018: 1-6.

“M. Garcia-Carpintero and S. Torre De Se Thought” Analysis Reviews, 2018: 1-4.

“Anna Boncompagni ‘Wittgenstein and Pragmatism. On Certainty in the Light of Peirce and James'”
Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy, 6/4, 2018.

“Duncan Pritchard Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing”
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2016

“Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans”
Analysis, 2015:

“Julia Tanney, Rules, Reason and Self-Knowledge”
Analysis, 74, 2014, pp. 353-355

“Jordi Fernandez, Transparent Minds”
Theoria, 81, 2014, pp. 442-445

“G. Gasser and M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013.06.33

(10) N. Vassallo, Per sentito dire. Conoscenza e testimonianza, Feltrinelli, 2011”, Iride XXVI/70, 2013, pp. 670-672.
(11) A. Paternoster, Il filosofo e i sensi, Carocci, 2007”, Il Protagora, 12, 2008, pp. 552-554.
(12) Lalumera, E. Normatività e concetti, Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004”, 2R, 6, 2007, pp. 12-19.
(13) Vignolo, M. Afferrare pensieri, Carocci, Roma 2001”, Epistemologia, 2004, pp. 356-359.
(14) Paternoster, A. Linguaggio e visione, Edizioni ETS, Pisa, 2001”, Dialectica, 57/1, 2003, pp. 97-99.
(15) Bermúdez, J. L. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, MIT, 1998”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp. 582-586.
(16) Cassam, Q. Self and World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp.654-656.
(17) Wright, C., Smith, B. C., Macdonald, C., (eds.) Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp. 586-589.
(18) McDowell, J. Mind, Value and Reality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)- London, 1998”, Lingua e Stile, 1999, 34, pp. 652-654.
(19) Dionigi, R. La fatica di descrivere. Itinerario di Wittgenstein nel linguaggio della filosofia, Vallecchi editore, 1997”, Lingua e Stile, 1998, 33, pp. 669-676.
(20) Bruschwig, J., Nussbaum, M. 1996 (eds.) Passions and Perceptions. Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, Cambridge, CUP”, Lingua e Stile, 1997, 32, pp. 655-656.
(21) Kim, J. 1996 Philosophy of Mind, Boulder (Colorado)-Oxford, Westview Press”, Lingua e Stile, 1997, 32, pp. 608-611.
(22) McGinn, M. 1997 Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, London and New York, Routledge”, Lingua e Stile, 1997, 32, pp. 583-588.
(23) Stroll, A. Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994”, Lingua e Stile, 1996, 31, pp. 588-595.
(24) Haldane, J., Wright, C. (eds.), Reality, Representation and Projection, New York-Oxford, OUP, 1993”, Lingua e Stile, 1996, 31, pp. 665-666.
(25) Williams, M. (ed.), Scepticism, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1993”, Lingua e Stile, 1996, 31, pp. 663-664.

Encyclopedic entries, miscellaneous
(1) “Eva Picardi. Un ricordo”, Il Protagora, 44/27-28, 2017, pp. 411-415.
(2) “Self-knowledge”. SAGE Encyclopedia of the Mind, ed. by Hal Pashler, 2013.
(3) (with Danièle Moyal-Sharrock) Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy, Oxford Bibliographies On-line, 2010, http://oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0127
(4) “La filosofia analitica”, in A. La Vergata (ed.) Filosofia e cultura, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 2007, vol. 3b, pp. 398-412.
(5) “Wittgenstein”, in A. La Vergata (ed.) Filosofia e cultura, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 2007, vol. 3b, pp. 419-432.
(6) “Linguaggio e filosofia”, in A. La Vergata (ed.) Filosofia e cultura, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 2007, vol. 3b, pp. 442-452.

Book Chapters


“Hinges, radical skepticism, relativism and alethic pluralism”
In N. Pedersen and L. Moretti (eds.) Non-evidentialist Epistemology, Brill

“I know, I know, I know. Hinge Epistemology, invariantism and skepticism”
In C. Kyriachou and J. Wallbridge (eds.) Invariantism and skepticism, London, Routledge.

“Which hinge epistemology between animal, bioscopic and constitutivist?”
In D. Moyal-Sharrock and C. Sandis (eds.) Hinge Epistemology, London, Anthem


“Against Wittgensteinian entitlements”
In N. Jang Lee Ling Pedersen and P. Graham (eds.) Epistemic Entitlement, Oxford University Press, pp. 327-343

“Wittgenstein’s critique of logical atomism in the Philosophical Investigations”
In U. Zilioli (ed.) Atomism in Philosophy. A History from Antiquity to Present, Bloomsbury, pp. 301-311

“What do philosophers do? Maddy, Moore (and Wittgenstein) II”
In J. Kennedy and S. Arbeiter (eds.) The Philosophy of Penelope Maddy, Springer

“In quest of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology”
In N. Da Costa and S. Wuppuluri (eds.) Looking at Things From the Point of View of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, Springer, pp. 107-121

“Hinge disagreement” (with M. Palmira)
In Kusch, M. (ed.) Social Epistemology and Epistemic Relativism, Routledge, pp. 11-29


“Waismann on belief and knowledge”
In S. Shapiro and D. Makovec (eds.) Friedrich Waismann. The Open Testure of Analytic Philosophy, London, Palgrave, 89-106

“Hinge epistemology and relativism”
In M. Kusch (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Routledge, pp. 320-328

“Dialetheism in action: a new strategy for solving the equal validity paradox” (with S. Moruzzi)
In A. Rieger and G. Young (eds.) Dialetheism and Its Applications, Springer, pp. 57-80


“What anti-realism about hinges could possibly be”
In Epistemic Realism and Anti-Realism: Approaches to Metaepistemology. Edited by R. McKenna and C. Kyriacou, London, Palgrave: 267-288

“Practical knowledge and linguistic competence”
In A. Coliva. S. Moruzzi and P. Leonardi (eds.) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, London, Palgrave

“Moore and Mooreanism”
In B. Reed and D. Machuca (eds.), Scepticism. From Antiquity to Present, Bloomsbury, pp. 467-480

“Wittgenstein, self-knowledge and nature”
In T. Raleigh and K. Cahill (eds.) Wittgenstein and Naturalism, Oxford-New York, Routledge, pp. 96-118

“Gettier and context” (with D. Belleri)
In S. Hetherington (ed.) Gettier and Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 78-95

“Self-knowing interpreters”
In J. Kirsch and P. Pedrini (eds.) Third Person Self-Knowledge, Interpretation and Narrative, Springer, pp. 13-29


“Rituals, Philosophy, Science, and Progress: Wittgenstein on Frazer”
In Beale J., Kidd I.J. (eds.), Wittgenstein and Scientism, Oxford-New York: Routledge, p. 39-58

“How to be a pluralist about self-knowledge”
In A. Coliva and N. Pedersen (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism, London, Palgrave, pp. 253-284


“Relativismo e differenza chez Wittgenstein”
In A. Contini, E. Moietta, A. Ramploud (eds.) Metamorfosi delle differenze, Roma, Aracne, pp. 119-147

“Wittgenstein. Quattro temi dalle Note sul Ramo d’oro di Frazer”
In D. Generali (ed.) Le radici della razionalità critica: saperi, pratiche, teleologie. Saggi in onore di Fabio Minazzi, Udine, Mimesis, pp. 86-105


“Moderatism, transmission failures, closure and Humean skepticism”
In D. Dodd and E. Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 248-272

“Faultless disagreement and the equal validity paradox” (with S. Moruzzi)
In F. Bacchini, S. Caputo, M. Dell´Utri (eds.) New Frontiers in Truth, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Cambridge, pp. 38-62

“Epistemology” (with M. C. Amoretti)
In T. Andina (ed.) Bridging the Analytic Continental Divide. A Companion to Contemporary Western Philosophy, Brill Leiden-Boston, pp. 38-64


“Scepticism and knowledge”
In M. Beaney (ed.) Oxford Handbook for the History of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 975-1002


“Relativismo e multiculturalismo” (with M. Palmira)
In C. Baraldi (ed.) Gli invisibili. La condizione degli immigrati nella società, Bonanno, Roma, pp. 19-39

“Epistemologia (o della conoscenza)” (with C. Amoretti)
In T. Andina (ed.) Filosofia contemporanea. Uno sguardo globale, Roma, Carocci, pp. 59-91

“Moore’s Proof, liberals and conservatives—is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?”
In A. Coliva (ed.) Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford, OUP, pp. 323-351

“One variety of self-knowledge: constitutivism as constructivism”
In A. Coliva (ed.) The Self and Self-Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 212-242

“Which key to all mythologies about the self?”
In F. Recanati and S. Prosser (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. New Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 22-45


“Intuizioni comode: Sosa tra Moore e Wittgenstein” (with M. Palmira)
In R. Davies (ed.) Analisi, Milano, Mimesis, pp. 291-304

“Wittgenstein out of context”
In C. Jaeger, W. Loeffler (eds.) Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg 7-13 Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 50-51


“Sull’idea stessa di relativismo”
In V. Villa (ed.) Relativismo: temi e prospettive, Roma, Aracne, pp. 155-175

“La verità di Rorty, tra Vattimo e Marconi”
In M. Carrara e V. Morato (eds.) Verità, Udine-Milano, Mimesis, pp. 261-270


“Cartesio: costitutivismo senza introspezionismo?”
in Dellantonio, S., Pastore, L. (eds.) Rappresentazione, percezione e coscienza, ETS, Pisa, pp. 95-113

“What kind of entities are concepts?”
In D. Gambarara, A. Givigliano (eds.) Origine e sviluppo del linguaggio, fra teoria e storia. Atti del XV Convegno della Società di filosofia del linguaggio, Aracne editrice, Roma, pp. 211-219


“Il relativismo si dice in molti modi. O forse in nessuno?”
In F. Giuliani e M. Barni (eds.) Il logos nella polis. La diversità delle lingue e delle culture, le nostre identità. Atti del XIV Convegno della Società di Filosofia del linguaggio, Roma, Aracne, pp. 439-452


“Lo scetticismo sull’esistenza del mondo esterno”
In A. Coliva (ed.) Filosofia analitica. Temi e problemi, Carocci, Roma, pp. 255-280

“Lo scetticismo sull’esistenza del mondo esterno”
In M. De Caro, E. Spinelli (eds.) Lo scetticismo antico e contemporaneo, Carocci, Roma, pp. 186-210. (Abridged version of 35)


“Moore’s paradox and commitments. On this very complicated concept of belief”
In P. Leonardi (ed.) Facets of concepts, Il Poligrafo, Padova, pp. 233-252


“Proof of an external world: transmission-failure, begging the question or dialectical ineffectiveness? Moore, Wright and Pryor”
In A. Coliva and E. Picardi (eds.), Wittgenstein Today. Il Poligrafo, Padova, pp. 411-429


“Moore’s Proof of an external world. Just begging the question”
In W. Loeffler and P. Weingartner (eds.) Proceedings Wittgenstein Symposium Kirchberg XI, Kirchberg am Wechsel, pp. 91-96

“Io pensieri e metafisica dell’io: ovvero dell’anti-cartesianesimo nella filosofia antica, medievale e analitica”
In M. Carrara, G. De Anna, S. Magrin (eds.) Saggi di filosofia del linguaggio, filosofia della mente e metafisica, Il Poligrafo, Padova, pp. 193-213


“In difesa del contenuto non-concettuale della percezione”
In P. Parrini (a cura di) Conoscenza e cognizione, Guerini, Milano, pp. 147-161


“Wittgenstein’s Distinction between Uses of ‘I’ as Subject and as Object at the Origin of the No-Subject View about the Self and its Solution”
In Berit Brogaard (ed.) Rationality and Irrationality Pre-proceedings of the 24th Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, pp. 117-122


“Wittgenstein: certezza versus scetticismo e naturalismo”
In D. Marconi (ed.) Naturalismo e naturalizzazione, Mercurio edizioni, Vercelli, pp. 169-187